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Much of what people learn is based on the testimony of 
others, but not all testimony is helpful.  This study explores 
how people deceive and how they deal with deceptive 
information in the context of a conceptual learning task.  
Participants play a game in which a learner infers the location 
of a rectangle based on the testimony of an informant, who is 
either helpful or deceptive.  We investigate the behavior of 
both informants and learners in this scenario. On the 
informant level, we demonstrate that people provide different 
information depending on whether they are helpful or 
deceptive.  Although deceptive informants do lie outright, 
they more often opt to mislead. From the learner’s 
perspective, we show that people do choose to verify 
information but no more often when the informant is 
deceptive. Despite this, we also find that learners are capable 
of accurately identifying who is deceptive and who is helpful. 
We conclude by examining common strategies used in the 
two conditions and their implications in real-world settings. 
Keywords: Lies; Pedagogical reasoning; Testimony. 
Introduction 
Much of what people learn is based on the testimony of 
others.  Unfortunately, not all informants are well 
intentioned.  For example, law enforcement officials must 
often reconstruct a series of events based only on 
information obtained from witnesses and suspects, some of 
whom may attempt to deceive the authorities.  For deceptive 
informants, there are many possible strategies: do they 
deceive by lying outright or by providing unhelpful 
information?  Similarly for learners, do people attempt to 
verify a potential deceiver’s testimony?  How do the results 
of this interaction affect people’s ability to recognize 
deception?  
Most of the research in this area has focused on people’s 
ability to recognize deception using its verbal and nonverbal 
characteristics (Brandt, Miller, & Hocking, 1982; DePaulo, 
Stone, & Lassiter, 1985; DeTruck & Miller, 1985; 
Littlepage & Pineault, 1985; Buller, Strzyzewski, & 
Hunsaker, 1991; Burgoon, Buller, & Floyd, 2001; Bond & 
DePaulo, 2006).  A typical deception detection study 
involves participants watching video clips of people either 
truthfully or falsely describing an experience or opinion. 
Based only on that information, participants are asked to 
distinguish the honest statements from the lies. Most people, 
including police officers, judges, and psychiatrists, perform 
at close to chance levels (Ekman & O'Sullivan, 1991). 
These results typically ignore the content of the information 
and focus on superficial cues to deception in one-off 
situations. 
We are interested in how deceptive interactions play out 
over time.  For example, guilty criminal suspects often try to 
convince the police of their innocence.  In response, police 
officers verify as many details of their testimony as possible 
and then decide whether to continue to focus on the suspect 
or pursue other leads. Analogously, consider a game in 
which a learner tries to learn a rectangular concept based on 
clues provided by an informant, who may be deceptive or 
helpful (see Figure 1).  Like the police, the learner can ask 
the informant or gather information on their own.  Like the 
suspect, the informant can lie or tell the truth, providing 
helpful or evasive information. To optimize learning, the 
learner must infer whether the informant is helpful or 
deceptive in order to decide whether to continue asking for 
help or gather information on his own.  Learners can also 
verify their information by investigating different points 
independently.  
 
Figure 1: The solid black line represents the rectangle presented to 
the informant.  The task of the informant is to enable the learner to 
guess the rectangle by providing interior (Y) and exterior (N) 
points. The learner can also independently explore certain points to 
verify ($ indicates a verified interior point, X a verified exterior 
point). The broken black line represents the learner’s attempt in 
that trial to reproduce the informant’s rectangle.  Figure 1a shows a 
successful cooperative strategy with verified corner hints.  Figure 
1b shows deceptive hints that were exposed as lies.  Figure 1c 
shows how hints can be truthful but unhelpful.  
 
Prior studies of inferential learning suggest that an 
informant’s intentions affect what information they provide.  
In a study using the game described above, informants were 
instructed to provide helpful examples for their learners 
(Shafto & Goodman, 2008).  These informants provided 
interior points that marked the rectangle’s corners or 
exterior points that marked its boundaries significantly more 
often than chance would predict.  This suggests that helpful 
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informants do not provide information at random but rather 
tailor their examples to the concepts they are trying to 
communicate. 
This purposeful sampling is not lost on learners.  Children 
as young as five years old interpret information differently 
depending on how it is communicated.  In a 2009 study, one 
function of a novel toy was demonstrated by a teacher, by 
apparent accident, or not at all (Bonawitz, Shafto, Gweon, 
Chang, Katz, & Shulz, 2009).  Children in the latter two 
conditions explored the toy’s other functions much more 
often than children who saw the purposeful demonstration, 
suggesting that children in the pedagogical condition 
inferred that there were no other functions to be found. 
How data are sampled also matters when learning words. 
Xu and Tenenbaum (2007) presented both children and 
adults with names for novel objects.  In one condition, the 
experimenter picked two other objects as examples; in the 
other, the participant chose the examples themselves.  
Participants who were given only one example by the 
experimenter tended to apply the object’s name more 
broadly.  Again, these results suggest that learners 
appreciate the significance of purposefully sampled 
information. 
Learners can also reason effectively about information 
from deceptive sources at an early age.  In a 2009 study, 
children were asked to find a piece of candy that had been 
hidden in one of two boxes (Mascaro & Sperber, 2009).  
The children watched while a puppet looked in both boxes.  
After the experimenter explained that the puppet always 
tells lies, the puppet told the child where the candy was.  
Four year-old children usually indicated that the candy was 
actually in the other box.  If the children are merely warned 
that the puppet does not want them to find the candy, 
comparable performance does not emerge until age six.  
In this paper, we contrast learning from teachers and 
deceivers.  Informants in both Bonawitz et al. (2009) and 
Xu and Tenenbaum (2007) were presented as 
knowledgeable and helpful.  Different issues may arise 
when the informant has ambiguous intentions.  In this paper, 
we present people with situations similar to those described 
in Figure 1.  Because participants interact by computer, 
most cues to deception are unavailable to learners and they 
must rely instead on their informant’s testimony.  We 
contrast the information provided by helpful and deceptive 
informants, focusing on three key questions. First, how does 
the information provided by helpful and deceptive 
informants differ? Second, how often do learners verify the 
information provided, and does this differ based on whether 
the informant is deceptive or not? Third, how effectively do 
people recognize when they are being deceived, given only 




One hundred and sixteen students at the University of 
Louisville participated in exchange for course credit. 
 
Procedure 
Pairs of participants were randomly assigned to a 
cooperative (n = 29) or competitive (n = 29) condition. Each 
individual was then randomly assigned to the role of 
informant or learner.  Participants were seated at computers 
on opposite sides of a solid screen.  They were then told that 
they were part of a police investigation of the Rectangle 
Gang, who got their name from their habit of splitting up the 
loot from a robbery into bags and burying them in 
rectangular plots of land. 
In both conditions, the learner was told that they would 
play the role of investigator.  They were also told that an 
informant, a former member of the gang who knew the 
locations and dimensions of all the rectangular plots of land 
where money had been hidden, was part of the investigation.   
Informants were told that they would play the role of the 
knowledgeable informant.   
When the investigator asked for a hint, informants were 
shown a blue rectangle in a white field.  This rectangle 
indicated the area where the money was buried.  Informants 
were instructed to click on a point in the field, mark it as 
either inside or outside the rectangle, and then send it to the 
learner. 
The instructions to the informant differed for the 
cooperative and competitive conditions.  Cooperative 
informants were instructed to be as helpful as possible and 
that their score would depend on how accurately the learner 
could reproduce the rectangle’s location.  In contrast, 
competitive informants were told to prevent the learner from 
discovering the true location of the rectangle and that the 
less accurately the learner could reproduce the rectangle’s 
location, the higher their score would be.  Although the 
accuracy of the learners’ drawings was recorded, the game 
score was not visible during the experiment.  
Learners in both conditions were instructed to find the 
edges of the rectangular plot in which money was buried.  A 
blank white field on the computer screen represented the 
search area.  Learners could either ask the informant for a 
hint or make exploratory “digs” by clicking anywhere in the 
field.  If they chose to dig, they would “find” either a green 
$ (representing a point inside the rectangle) or a red X (an 
exterior point).   If they asked for a hint, the informant’s 
response would appear on their field as either a green Y 
(indicating a place where the informant said that money is 
buried) or a red N (indicating a place where the informant 
said that there was nothing).  Learners did not know whether 
their informant was cooperative or competitive but were 
warned of both possibilities.  Learners had five 
opportunities to gather evidence in any combination of digs 
or hints for a given field.  They were then asked to infer the 
location of the rectangular plot by clicking and dragging 
with the mouse. A total of twenty fields were presented. 
In the final part of the experiment, learners were asked to 
rate their informants on a scale from 1 (extremely deceptive) 
to 21 (extremely helpful).  Learners were told that choosing 
11 (the midpoint) meant that they did not have an opinion 
either way.  Learners were then asked for a written 
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justification for their rating.  A review of these justifications 
indicated that in two cases one or other of the participants 
had not understood their instructions.  Those data were 
excluded. In addition, a review of the data indicated that 
some cooperative informants gave more deceptive hints than 
helpful ones and some learners made more than five errors 
(including a verified exterior point or excluding a verified 
interior point) when drawing their rectangles.  The data 
from these four games were also excluded, leaving twenty-
six games in each condition. 
 
Results 
Our first question was about how informant type affects 
the kind of information given. To explore this, we define the 
information’s helpfulness based on how accurately a learner 
could use it to reproduce the informant’s rectangles.  For 
each field, the distance in pixels from each vertex of the 
informant’s rectangle to the corresponding vertex of the 
learner’s rectangle was calculated.  These distances were 
summed to provide a measurement of the learner’s error for 
that rectangle. As Figure 2 demonstrates, learners in the 
cooperative condition had lower error than those in the 
competitive condition (cooperative: M = 594.30 pixels, SD 
= 266.27; competitive: M = 825.12 pixels, SD = 168.78, 
t(50) = 3.73, p < 0.001). This suggests that cooperative 
informants may have provided more helpful information. 
 
Figure 2: Mean rectangle error by condition. Participants made 
more errors when faced with a deceptive informant (competitive 
condition).  Error bars represent ±1 SEM. 
 
What information was provided? Comparing 
deceptive and helpful informants 
Why did learners in the cooperative condition perform 
better?  One possibility is that they simply requested more 
information. However, learners in the cooperative condition 
did not ask for significantly more hints than those in the 
competitive condition (cooperative: M = 22.81, SD = 18.43; 
competitive: M = 17.08, SD = 14.79; t(50) = 1.24, p = 
0.22). 
Another possibility is that informants in the deceptive 
condition told more lies. In this game, a lie is either an 
interior point that the informant labeled as exterior or vice 
versa.  The number of lies in each game was divided by the 
total number of hints.  As Figure 3 shows, competitive 
informants lied more than cooperative informants (M = 
0.41, SD = 0.34 vs. M = 0.067, SD = 0.14, t(50) = 4.70, p < 
0.001).  Moreover, the proportion of lies told was correlated 
with rectangle error, suggesting that lying to learners did 
affect their ability to ascertain the truth (r = 0.40, p < 0.01). 
 
Figure 3: Left: Informants lied about 40% of the time in the 
competitive condition but only rarely in the cooperative condition. 
Error bars represent ±1 SEM.  Right: Increased lying is related to 
higher error in guessing the rectangle. 
 
Just as in real life, it was possible to mislead even while 
giving apparently truthful information. For instance, 
providing a negative example far away from the rectangle’s 
edge may be technically accurate but gives a misleading 
sense of the rectangle’s boundaries. How often did 
deceptive informants rely on this type of misinformation? 
We explored this by calculating what percent of hints were 
exterior points at least 35 pixels away from the rectangle’s 
edges. As Figure 4 shows, competitive informants provided 
many more of these (competitive: M = 0.31, SD = 0.32; 
competitive: M = 0.10, SD = 0.12; t(50) = 3.06, p < .01).  
Figure 4 also shows the proportion of interior points that 
were at least 35 pixels inside. Interestingly, cooperative 
informants provided these clues much more often 
(cooperative: M = 0.36 SD = 0.30; competitive: M = 0.12, 
SD = 0.17; t(50) = 3.54, p < .01), which may be related to 
the fact that learners were allowed five hints (considerably 
more than the two required to mark the corners).  Neither 
the exterior nor the interior hints were correlated with 
rectangle error (exterior: r = 0.23, p = 0.10; interior: r = -
0.10, p = 0.48). 
    
Figure 4: Cooperative informants gave many more unhelpful 
interior points (black), while competitive informants gave many 
more unhelpful exterior points (white).  Error bars represent ±1 
SEM. 
 
The results suggest that correctly labeled points marking 
the inside corners of the rectangles (as in Figure 1a) were 
especially helpful.  Eighty-five percent of the hints given to 
the five most successful learners in the cooperative 
condition (those more than one standard deviation below the 
































































these hints is the best predictor of rectangle error (r = -0.63, 
p < 0.001).   
Other kinds of information seem to have been of 
relatively little use.  In contrast to the steady stream of 
corner hints given to the most successful learners, the four 
worst learners in the competitive condition (those more than 
one standard deviation above the mean error) received a 
mixture of different hints.  Although deceptively labeled 
exterior points made up 52% of the hints, correctly labeled 
interior points marking corners (11%), correctly labeled 
exterior points marking edges (9%), and correctly labeled 
interior points close to the center of the rectangle (11%) 
were also represented.   
How does the information provided by cooperative and 
competitive informants differ?  Higher error in the 
competitive condition was associated with fewer corner 
hints and more deceptive hints.  Evasive hints were also 
more common.  This suggests that competitive informants 
successfully misled their learners by providing unhelpful 
information.   
 
How often did learners verify information? 
Our second question was whether learners would verify 
the information given to them, and whether the tendency to 
verify would be affected by whether the informant was 
helpful or deceptive.  Because they had the option of 
searching for evidence independently, learners could request 
a hint and then “check” the hint by digging in the same 
place.  This checking strategy could be used to verify 
truthful hints and catch lies.  One might expect that learners 
in the competitive condition would check their hints more 
often, but this was not the case. The mean proportion of 
hints checked was the same for both conditions and was not 
correlated with rectangle error (cooperative: M = 0.28, SD = 
0.31; competitive: M = 0.29, SD = 0.32; r = -0.10, p = 
0.46).  This result seems to reflect a reluctance among 
learners in the competitive condition to check their hints, 
possibly because they had only five opportunities to gather 
information about a given field.  Checking information 
would have meant one less opportunity to gather additional 
information.  However, considering that games consisted of 
twenty fields with five chances to gather information in 
each, learners actually had ample opportunity to establish 
whether their informants were cooperative or competitive, 
suggesting that learners in the competitive condition did not 
see a need to check their informants’ hints. 
Interestingly, 19 of the 52 learners – more than a third – 
did not check a single hint.  Did checking help the 
remaining learners to guess the rectangles’ dimensions more 
accurately? As Figure 5 shows, we found that checking 
hints was weakly associated with higher accuracy in the 
cooperative but not in the competitive condition (ANOVA: 
2 (condition: cooperative vs. competitive) x 2 (checking: 
checkers vs. non-checkers); F(1,48) = 3.27, p = 0.077).  
Still, the mean proportion of checks was significantly 
correlated with rectangle error in the cooperative condition 
(r = -0.51, p < 0.01).   
 
Figure 5: Left: A marginal interaction between condition (white = 
cooperative, black = competitive) and learner type suggests that 
checking was only helpful for learners in the cooperative 
condition.  Error bars represent ±1 SEM.  Right: increased 
checking is related to lower error in the cooperative condition. 
 
How often do learners verify the information provided, 
and does this differ based on whether the informant is 
deceptive or not?  The data suggest that learners checked 
about 30% of their hints in both conditions on average, 
although individual behaviors varied widely.  Not all 
learners attempted to verify information from a potentially 
deceptive informant. 
 
How well do learners recognize deception? 
   Our third question was whether people were capable of 
recognizing deception even in the absence of superficial 
cues like affect or tone. As Figure 6 demonstrates, 
cooperative informants received significantly higher ratings 
than competitive informants (cooperative: M = 16.64, SD = 
3.82; competitive: M = 9.48, SD = 5.43, t(49) = 5.43, p < 
.001). 
How were people able to identify the deceptive 
informants? One possibility is that they made use of the 
verifiable information to check the hints offered by the 
informant. However, Figure 6 also shows that checking did 
not affect ratings in either condition (ANOVA: 2 (condition: 
cooperative vs. competitive) x 2 (checking: checkers vs. 
non-checkers); F(1,47) = 25.59, p < 0.001). 
The data do suggest that different types of checked hints 
may communicate different information. Intuitively, a 
verified truthful hint should boost learners’ confidence in 
their informants, while an exposed deceptive hint (caught 
lie) should lower it.  We define verified truthful hints and 
caught lies as proportions of the number of requests.  Both 
types of hints were correlated with informant ratings in the 
expected directions (verified truthful: r = 0.56, p < 0.001; 
caught lies: r = -0.76, p < 0.001).  Figure 6 shows the 
relationship between the proportion of verified truthful hints 
minus the proportion of caught lies (check difference) and 
informant rating (r = 0.79, p < 0.001).  This suggests that 
learners may be willing to give inconsistent informants the 
benefit of the doubt as long as the majority of the 























Figure 6: Left: Cooperative learners (white) rated their informants 
as more helpful whether they checked hints or not.  Right: Ratings 
were strongly associated with the proportion of verified truthful 
hints minus the proportion of caught lies. This suggests that the 
ability to identify deception is more dependent on the results of 
checking rather than the frequency. 
 
Another clue to the informants’ intentions may have been 
the information itself.  The proportion of corner hints was 
correlated with informant rating, as was the proportion of 
unhelpful exterior hints (corners: r = 0.50, p < 0.001; 
unhelpful: r = -0.28, p < 0.05).  These correlations were 
strengthened by including other types of hints.  Cooperative 
learners received mostly corner hints and unhelpful interior 
hints (M = 0.69, SD = 0.27).  Taken together, the proportion 
of truthful interior hints was correlated with informant 
rating (r = 0.76, p < 0.001).  In contrast, competitive 
learners received mostly distant exterior points (M = 0.61, 
SD = 0.28).  Fifty-one percent of these hints were accurately 
labeled but evasive.  The rest were lies.  Taken together, the 
proportion of distant exterior points was negatively 
correlated with rectangle error (r = -0.77, p < 0.001).   
These results suggest that learners made inferences about 
the deceptiveness or helpfulness of an informant in order to 
guide their overall strategy. Although the mean number of 
requests did not vary by condition, it was correlated with 
informant rating (r = 0.42, p < 0.01).  This suggests that 
learners who believed that their informants were helpful 
asked for more hints.  Furthermore, these learners tended to 
interpret positive examples as corner hints, as predicted by 
Shafto and Goodman (2008).  This result also agrees with 
the findings of Bonawitz et al. (2009) regarding exploration. 
Learners who believed that their hints were purposefully 
sampled rarely searched beyond the boundaries suggested 
by positive examples. 
How effectively do people recognize when they are being 
deceived?  Learners had little difficulty distinguishing 
cooperative and competitive informants, even when they did 
not verify their information.  This suggests that learners may 
have based their inferences on the type and frequency of 
hints they received. 
 
General Discussion 
In this experiment we addressed three fundamental 
questions about how people behave in situations involving 
deception. We found that deceptive informants give a 
different pattern of data than helpful informants and that the 
most effective liars combine outright lying, misleading 
truths, and helpful hints. Surprisingly, we also found that 
learners did not verify more often when faced with 
deceptive agents and that increased verification was only 
associated with improved performance in the cooperative 
condition. However, learners were very good at recognizing 
deceptive agents, even when they did not verify their 
information. 
One intriguing implication of our results is that long-term 
deception may have as much to do with evasion as actual 
lies.  Although competitive informants lied more often than 
their cooperative counterparts, they still provided more 
accurately labeled hints than lies (probably because outright 
lies would be easier to spot).  However, unlike the corner 
hints characteristic of cooperative informants, accurately 
labeled hints from competitive informants tended to mark 
distant exterior points.  This suggests that competitive 
informants understood what kinds of hints would be most 
helpful and deliberately avoided providing them. 
These findings suggest a possible strategy for identifying 
deceptive sources of information.  Consider a police officer 
interviewing a suspected murderer.  The officer need not 
structure the interrogation around catching the suspect in a 
lie.  A cautious suspect may never tell one.  An alternative 
strategy would be to compare the suspect’s testimony to the 
“ideal” testimony: information that the officer would find 
most helpful in terms of cracking the case.  Discrepancies 
would suggest an uncooperative suspect, assuming that the 
suspect has some knowledge of the crime. 
Our results also illustrate how people’s expectations guide 
their inferences.  Earlier research has shown that learners 
interpret purposefully sampled examples more narrowly 
than randomly sampled information (Bonawitz et al., 2009; 
Xu & Tenenbaum, 2007).  In other words, learners have 
expectations about information from helpful sources.  These 
expectations may help explain why informant ratings were 
related to the proportion of verified truthful hints and caught 
lies.  Informants whose hints matched the learners’ 
preconceptions of what helpful hints would be were given 
relatively high ratings, while informants whose hints did not 
meet the standard were assumed to be unhelpful. 
These findings suggest how the hypothetical murder 
suspect may successfully deceive his interviewing officer.  
The officer expects testimony that is both truthful and 
helpful.  The murder suspect, assuming that he is guilty and 
wants to get away with his crime, should provide a mixture 
of information: enough helpful information to maintain the 
officer’s trust but enough deceptive and evasive information 
to confound the investigation.  The suspect could build his 
credibility further by providing truthful, helpful information 
that the officer can verify.  Our research suggests that these 
verifications may even offset the damage caused by the 
occasional lie. 
Because the design of the game used in this study allows 
us to clearly define abstract concepts such as evasion and 
trust, it can be used to explore other aspects of deception.  





















informant decides whether or not to provide information.  
The findings would be most relevant to commercial 
transactions.  For example, a person trying to sell a used car 
chooses what aspects of the car’s history to share with 
potential buyers, who then decide whether or not to make 
the purchase.  Ideally, these results would used to construct 
computational models of human deception that would 
generalize to more naturalistic settings. 
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